Tuesday, September 16, 2025

My thoughts on the Memorandum “Protecting Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace”

     On July 28, 2025, the United States Office of Personnel Management put out a memorandum to all federal agencies regarding “Protecting Religious Expression in the FederalWorkplace.” I saw this memorandum pop up on the Drudge Report with the headline: “Administration urges federal employees to talk religion at work... Can Proselytize in the Office...” The article that it linked to felt a little sensationalized, but it had a link to the memorandum itself, so I decided to read it over and come to my own conclusion about it.

     For context, I have some qualifications to review and analyze this memo. I worked for seven years as an Equal Employment Opportunity Specialist. Part of that work included handling religious accommodations in the workplace, as well as training employees on their rights and responsibilities under equal opportunity laws, touching on topics such as religious expression in the workplace. While I did not work for a federal agency, my employment was public-sector, which is an important detail because public-sector employees (including in federal government) have speech protections which private-sector employees do not have. These protections are in place to ensure government employees can engage in their free speech rights when not working in their official government capacities, since their official duties might at times conflict with their speech rights. (Speaking of which, the opinions expressed in this essay are my own and do not reflect the official position of any current or previous employers. Thank you.)

     Before we get into the new memo, let’s establish a baseline for what the law says about religious expression in the workplace. Are you allowed to express your religion in the workplace? Yes. The answer is yes. In theory, the answer has always been yes, though in practice the answer has only been yes since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act explicitly forbids discrimination on the basis of religion. Furthermore, it explicitly requires that employers accommodate employees’ religious beliefs. Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act, employees could be fired for their religious expression, in or out of the workplace.

     Despite the fact that the law is actually more tolerant today towards religious expression than it was in previous generations, many people still feel their religious expression is suppressed, and they question how far their religious expression can go. When I worked in this field, I often had to answer employee questions on this topic. Whenever I answered, I tried never to get technical with my answer. Instead, I would offer this general rule of thumb: to whatever extent work allows you to express yourself, it needs to allow you to express your religion. I call this a general rule of thumb because it might not cover all situations, particularly when an employee requests to accommodate a religious practice. However, this answer usually covered the situations employees were most concerned about. It’s also a fairly simple rule to follow. If employee A is allowed to put up a poster of Taylor Swift in their cubicle, employee B is allowed to put up a poster of Jesus in theirs. If employee A is allowed to display pictures of vacation, employee B is allowed to display pictures of church. If employee A is allowed to keep romance literature at their desk, employee B is allowed to keep religious literature at their desk.

     Conversely, if a general form of personal expression is banned in the workplace, this would usually cover religious expression of that same type. For example, if employees are not allowed to play music at work, this ban would apply to gospel music or hymns. Workplaces might have safety rules prohibiting jewelry, and this would include religious jewelry. There may be some exceptions for employees who have a religious practice that their faith requires of them. An example might include allowing an employee to wear a head scarf worn for religious observance when the workplace would otherwise ban headwear. Still, as a general rule, religious expression can be prohibited insofar as specific forms of expression can be prohibited.

     In my experience, a lot of employees are concerned about expressing their beliefs at work, and this is something that I always had to ensure people they were allowed to do. ("Yes, you can wish somebody a Merry Christmas." I would take note of what was general practice at the different locations I went to. Some locations wanted their lockers free from all decorations, while others allowed employees to post magnets and stickers. Either was permissible, so long as they were consistent and treated religious expressions no worse than non-religious expressions. Some locations had no decorations. Other locations had open displays of Bibles and crucifixes. Either of these were fine; again, so long as I saw the practice was consistent in that location.

     To illustrate this point about consistency, I want to give a real-life case I worked on. I will keep some details out and not give any personal identifiers, but otherwise this is a real example. I once received a request from an employee who expressed that their faith felt violated by the COVID screening process at their workplace. They requested to be exempt from the process. The employee did not have any issues with being screened for COVID in general, but they presented a religious disagreement with our process.

     The program area denied that their COVID screening practices were in any way harmful or violating, but the employee expressed their religious beliefs were being violated. I was responsible for mediating this situation. On initial review, it was difficult to assess exactly what part of this requestion was “religious,” but guidance on the law usually requires the employer to assume employees are sincere when they state their religious beliefs, absent concrete indicators of dishonesty. So I investigated this matter acting under the assumption this request was made in good faith. Upon investigating, I discovered that our policy allowed people to take the COVID screening in private, and, indeed, many employees did take the screening in private. They needed to take a cotton swab sample (only if unvaccinated) and then input some information on a computer. Most people would take the swab sample in the privacy of their cubicle. Some people used the restrooms. I asked the program head about this practice, and they clarified for me that the policy did not require any witnesses. Employees had total privacy under the policy when taking the sample.

     When I looked at the employee’s work unit, however, I discovered that all the unvaccinated employees had to take their COVID swabs in a room together with no privacy. As a result, they all had to witness each other taking the screening. One consequence of this was that employees would all know each other’s vaccination status, which many people did not like to share. This practice was not intentional. The work location had very few private areas. It was not an office-type location. Still, the standard of privacy was not being followed. 

     After investigating, I was able to ascertain that it was this lack of privacy that was the issue. I worked with the supervisor to find a private location for this employee to take their swab. When I called the employee back, I was able to protect our COVID screening program by maintaining the integrity of our program and informing them they would still be required to abide by the policy. However, I explained to them that I had investigated and discovered they were not being afforded the same privacy as other employees. I offered the employee the opportunity to use a private location for their screening, and they were genuinely happy that I was able to arrange this. They told me they were considering quitting, but they would accept this accommodation and stay.

     When working with religious beliefs, the goal is not to agree with (or even understand) the other person’s religious expression but to help that employee practice their religion in a way that brings them to parity with other employees. By taking this employee seriously, I discovered they were not being offered parity with other employees. We were in the practice of giving people privacy for their COVID screening. Therefore, we were required to offer the same level of privacy to the person who needed it for religious reasons.

     The above example is actually a case of accommodating a religious belief. It is not really about religious expression per se, but hopefully it illustrates the attitude we should have towards religious expression in the workplace. It is this attitude I always carried with me when I performed my job. Turning now to the new memorandum, I could see this same attitude being expressed in the new guidance being offered. At one point, it says explicitly:

“Employees must be allowed to engage in private religious expression in work areas to the same extent that they may engage in nonreligious private expression.”

     As far as I’m concerned, I’d be happy if that were the entire memo. This is exactly what the law has been since 1964. It’s what I’ve been saying for years, and it’s how I’ve trained employees on the issue. Obviously, you can say that and still question the application in any given scenario, but this principle remains the same.

     In general, this new memorandum is based on equal opportunity principles that most employers already follow, because these principles are already encoded in the law. Equal opportunity law is the result of legal precedent building up over the past 60 years. Employers follow these laws not just because they are good employers but because they can be sued if they don’t. The fact that this memo gets a lot of things right is not particularly notable to me. Getting this law right is literally the job that tens of thousands of administrators in America do every day, including myself. That said, this memo has two glaring problems, which we need to discuss.

     The first problem with this memo is that, throughout the memo, the Office of Personnel Management brings up many examples (good examples, in fact) of permissible religious expression in the workplace; however, their examples entirely exclude examples outside of Christianity or Judaism. The examples all lean heavily Christian, with sporadic Jewish examples inserted. For example, when giving examples of “indicia of religion”, it cites “crosses, crucifixes and mezuzahs.” It says an employee should be allowed to “keep a Bible on her desk,” and “may keep rosary beads or tefillin on her desk.” It continues that if the workplace allows posters, then it must allow religious posters, such as “those of a crucifix, a Bible verse, or a Star of David.” It says that “an employee may wear a cross, [or wear] clothing displaying a religious message.”

     I want to be clear: these are all perfectly good examples. I personally have kept some of these items at my work desk. The memo is correct that these must be allowed (again, to the extent other personal displays are allowed). However, to act as though this document accurately presents the full range of religious expression allowed under the law would be disingenuous. This is illustrated by the lack of even a single Islamic example mentioned in this memo, even when such examples abound in the law. In fact, this memo cites a Supreme Court case, E.E.O.C v. Abercrombie & Fitch, which was won by a Muslim employee who was discriminated against because she wore a headscarf; but despite the fact that the memo cites this case, it entirely omits any mention of employees having the right to wear head coverings at work, which is really strange, right? This memo is, after all, guidance for all employees on their right to express their religion at work, and yet it deliberately omits a clearly established religious expression.

     There is nothing wrong with putting together a document that tells Christians or Jews what their rights to religious expression are in the workplace. However, there is something wrong with putting together a document that purports to tell all employees what their rights to religious expression are in the workplace, and then proceeding to exclude all religions but Christianity and Judaism from active consideration. The result is that this document omits large subsets of religious expression.

     What you count as religious expression is itself at least partially a function of religious belief. When I was handling religious accommodations, do you know what was the number one most common religious request I received? It was a request to grow a beard and be exempt from any facial hair grooming requirements. Yes, beards are a form of religious expression. Just because most western Christians do not consider beards to be a form of religious expression, that doesn’t mean they’re not. Many Eastern Christians, Muslims, and Jews, not to mention smaller religious groups such as Sikhs or Rastafarians, consider beard growth to be an important form of religious expression. And yet, you will nowhere find beards in this new document for federal employees, just as you will find no reference to head coverings.

     I understand that a 5-page memo cannot be exhaustive. Certain things will always be overlooked, and that is unavoidable. However, as I look over this document, the complete and total omission of common forms of religious expression that fall outside the Western Christian paradigm is enough to make me believe this document is not meant for people of other faiths at all. To drive this point home, the document explicitly covers inviting coworkers and subordinates to church with examples such as, “an employee might invite another to worship at her church despite being belonging (sic) to a different faith,” and “a supervisor may post a handwritten note inviting each of his employees to attend an Easter service at his church.” That this document only cites explicitly Christian worship centers (churches) and Christian celebrations (Easter) is an indication that the document is biased. 

     Having said my piece about the bias shown in this memo, nothing I have said up until now has touched upon the soundness of the advice it contains. The exclusion of other groups, such as Muslims or Hindus, does not necessarily make the advice offered to Christians wrong or misguided. I cannot say, however, that I agree with all the advice that is given. I will warn my readers that the next part is highly technical. I am not giving any legal advice here, because I’m not qualified to. However, I need to get into some technicalities of the law to show my issues.

     The OPM memo, as the headlines indicated, tells agencies that employees are permitted to proselytize in the workplace. However, it indicates that there may be some limits to the amount of proselytizing that is permitted. I will quote this part at length:

Employees may engage in conversations regarding religious topics with fellow employees, including attempting to persuade others of the correctness of their own religious views, provided that such efforts are not harassing in nature. (Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1996). Such attempts must not be harassing in nature.) Employees may also encourage their coworkers to participate in religious expressions of faith, such as prayer, to the same extent that they would be permitted to encourage coworkers participate in other personal activities. The constitutional rights of supervisors to engage in such conversations should not be distinguished from non-supervisory employees by the nature of their supervisory roles. However, unwillingness to engage in such conversations may not be the basis of workplace discipline. (Formatted for internal citations.)

     It is true that there are limits to proselytizing in the workplace, and it is a good thing this memo touches on that point. Having said that, there are two things wrong with this paragraph I have quoted. Firstly, the paragraph cites a court case from the 4th circuit, Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, which it uses to establish that religious proselytizing is not protected if it becomes harassing. The problem here is that I have read the Chalmers decision, and the court decision never addresses the issue of harassment. (https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/101/1012/596374/)  The word “harassment” appears only twice in the decision, but not in the analysis of Chalmers’ actions which were the subject of the case. For a quick summery, Chalmers was a Christian manager who wrote personal letters to two of her employees accusing them of having sin in their lives that they needed God for. The employer fired Chalmers after one of these letters fell into the hands of the employee’s wife, who then accused her husband of infidelity based on Chalmers’ vague language. (In reality, Chalmers was referring to a work issue.) Chalmers claimed that her letters were expressing her religious views and were therefore protected speech. However, the 4th Circuit Court ruled that the employer was under no obligation to accommodate such religious expression.

     In the Chalmers’ case, the court determined that Chalmers’ actions were not protected and that the employer was at liberty to terminate her employment. However, the court’s analysis did not depend on whether Chalmers’ actions constituted harassment. Rather, it determined that Chalmers’ religious expression was not something that could be accommodated. To quote the court, “Chalmers' supervisory position at the Richmond office heightens the possibility that Tulon (through Chalmers) would appear to be imposing religious beliefs on employees. Cf. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1342 ("Title VII does not require an employer to allow an employee to impose ... religious views on others").”

     You see, the problem with this citation is that it has nothing to do with the memo’s content for which it is cited. The OPM memo speaks of harassment, but this case does not address harassment. In fact, this case runs contrary to the memo’s position. The court said that Chalmers’ supervisory position gave the appearance that the company, through Chalmers, could be held liable for imposing religion on its employees. The OPM memo, on the other hand, states that supervisors “should not be distinguished from non-supervisory employees,” in regards to religious expression. Obviously, the OPM memo is saying the exact opposite of their source. Either supervisors are treated the same (as the memo says) or they are held to a heightened standard (as the court said). 

     This brings me to my second and more important point. In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it states the following:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (Internal numbering omitted.)

     Take note that the Civil Right Act never mentions harassment. The reason is simple. Harassment is not the standard that makes an action discriminatory. The law forbids discriminatory terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The courts have decided that workplace discriminatory harassment, when it is severe or pervasive, amounts to discriminatory terms, conditions, or privileges. However, it is important to understand that harassment is illegal because it falls under the general category of discrimination. It is not the standard by which discrimination is judged.  

     In fact, just last year, the Supreme Court decided another case regarding the definition of discrimination under Title VII. Up until last year, some courts held that, in certain discrimination cases, the plaintiffs needed to show that the discrimination had left them “significantly worse off” in order for them to have a Title VII claim. The Supreme Court disagreed with this. In Muldrow v. St. Louis, Chief Justice John Robert’s wrote for himself and five of his colleagues, to say that the plaintiff in a discrimination case “does not have to show . . . that the harm incurred was significant. Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar. 'Discriminate against' means treat worse, . . . But neither that phrase nor any other says anything about how much worse.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

     While it is true that “treating worse” would include harassment, it is not necessarily the case that something needs to reach the level of harassment before it amounts to treating somebody worse. The OPM memo seems to acknowledge two limits to religious expression in the workplace. One is that the proselytizing cannot be harassing, and the other is that an employee’s refusal to engage cannot be used as a basis of discipline. However, harassment and disciplining are not the only forms of “treating worse.” Any form of “treating worse” based on religion is illegal under the Civil Rights Act. Religious expression that has the effect of treating certain employees worse than others, based on their difference of religion, is illegal. Even assuming a standard of harassment, the definition of what counts as harassment is highly flexible. Under Federal law, as determined by the courts, harassment is illegal when it is “’severe or pervasive.” However, this standard might be hard to square with the court’s recent decision in Muldrow, which appears to eschew the question of severity entirely and focus purely on “treating worse.” Some states, such as New York, already have a more expansive definition of harassment. New York’s standard of harassment is anything more than “what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences.”

     The problem here is that the OPM memo is highly dubious in the limits it sets on religious proselytizing. It sets the standard at “harassment,” but fails to mention that harassment is merely a subcategory of discrimination, not a standard, and it cites a court case that actually runs counter to its point. It states that employees who refuse to engage in proselytizing cannot be disciplined, but we know that Titile VII also offers protections against demotions, discharges, refusal to promote, or subjecting to any inferior work conditions. 

     The problem here is that the memo fails to established the actual limits on religious expression in the workplace, especially when it comes to directing that expression towards people who do not share their belief. In this regards, employees who follow the direction of this memo may be subjecting themselves to legal risk without even knowing it. Employees like Chalmers may think they are acting in a protected manner, when they are not. The fact that the memo misrepresents cases like Chalmers is highly concerning. For this reason, I would not ever point to this memo for guidance on religious expression in the workplace.

     If you are looking for guidance on religious expression in the workplace, I would recommend two things, just to keep it simple. First, you should limit your religious expression within the confines of other general topics, as I discussing above. If somebody wishes you "Happy Holidays," feel free to give them a "Merry Christmas." I am personally in the practice of wishing people "Merry Christmas and (insert happy holidays or name of holiday I know they celebrate here)." If people form book clubs at work, you can form a Bible club. Etc. Etc. Etc. I won't belabor this point. 

     Second, if there is any religious expression you wish to partake in at work that you think extends beyond the limits of other forms of expression, then submit a request for religious accommodation. Tell your supervisor you have a religious belief or practice that you wish to express at work. Your employer is legally obligated to consider your request and engage in a non-adversarial interactive process to determine if your religious practice can be accommodated without undue hardship. Examples of a request for religious accommodation include, but aren't limited to, requesting to wear a cross when the employer has a no-jewelry policy; requesting time to pray during hours not normally designated for lunch or break; requesting an exception from clothing or groomer requirements to accommodate religious hairstyle or religious garb; requesting to post a church activity on a bulletin board usually reserved for internal memos; requesting to be exempt from representing your company or agency at an event you morally object to. This list could go on. 

     The important thing to note here is that your request can be denied. If you work in proximity to an MRI machine, you can be denied the request to wear a cross due to the inherent danger posed by the machine. If you are a security guard with fixed posts and schedules, you may be denied the request for prayer breaks outside your standard schedule. If you are a corrections officer, you may be denied your religious request to grow a beard as beards interfere with gas masks used during emergency protocols. You are not guaranteed the right to your expression. You are, however, guaranteed by the law to get full consideration of your request. 

     Finally, if you are uncertain whether a certain religious expression falls under the first category or second category, you can always ask your HR representative. The bad news is, you will probably get a non-committal answer. I know. I've been in those situations where I was the HR representative giving the non-committal answer. Take that as a sign that you should either refrain from that expression, or you should submit a Request for Religious Accommodation.